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LAUNCH FACILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR A LIQUID FLUORINE UPPER STAGE
Charles A. Hall, Thomas J, Pharo, Jr., and Lawrence J, Rose
Martin Marietta Corporation
Denver Division
ABSTRACT
In a parallel activity to the development of a
liquid fluorine upper stage vehicle, the problems
associated with the launch facility must be ad
dressed. This paper describes the factors that
must be considered in the design and operation of
such a facility. Among the factors discussed are
general fluorine system requirements, launch facil
ity requirements, safety considerations, and modi
fication costs. Specific attention is given to
storage and transfer, vapor disposal, leak detec
tion, spills, aborts, range safety, and personnel
protection.

some conditions , and frequently these reactions
are violent. Clean metals react slowly with
fluorine at ambient or lower temperatures, form
ing a metal fluoride film on the surface that
stops or greatly reduces subsequent reaction.
However, if the metal is contaminated, the fluo
rine reaction with the contaminant may increase
the local temperature to the point where the
metal will react rapidly with the fluorine. If
the fluorine supply is not removed, this reaction
may become self sustaining. Organic materials
generally react violently on contact with fluo
rine, resulting in ignition or explosion. The
heat of reaction is always high and unless the
heat can be rapidly transferred away from the re
action zone, ignition is probable.

INTRODUCTION

A parallel activity to the development of a fluo
rine stage is the development of the supporting
ground facility. General information regarding
handling of fluorine is available but the specific
problems associated with fluorine aerospace ground
equipment require delineation. In particular, it
is necessary to consider the problems associated
with the handling of this extremely reactive propellant in areas where personnel and sophisticated
equipment are needed to support normal launch ac
tivities of an upper stage containing up to 20,000
Ib of fluorine. The general safety requirements
for liquid fluorine will be more severe than those
imposed on systems using earth storable propellants. Consequently, extreme care must be taken
to minimize all hazards associated with fluorine.
This paper describes the equipment and techniques
that must be considered for such a facility modi
fication.

The degree of the reaction with any material is a
function of the quantity and concentration of
fluorine available, material, temperature, and
Since a wide variety of
time of exposure.
operating conditions will exist, and material
compatibility is a function of these conditions,
it is very important that the material selection
be based on the actual intended use, e.g., ma
terials compatible with gaseous fluorine may not
be compatible with liquid fluorine.
System Cleanliness
The most important factor in the safe operation
of a facility using liquid fluorine is system
cleanliness. The majority of system failures due
to burn out or ignition can probably be traced to
contaminants in the system. Commercial liquid
and gaseous fluorine contain contaminants such as
OF2 , 02, N2 , CFi^, C02> and HF, but the quantities
are generally small and present no great problem.
System corrosion may be increased due to these
contaminants, but it is felt that this increase

GENERAL FLUORINE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
The highly reactive nature of fluorine requires
that the fluorine system be specially constructed
and prepared. The selection of materials, control
of contamination,and passivation of the system are
primary examples of these general requirements.
Numerous documents, such as references listed, give
extensive data in these areas. The use of these
documents is highly recommended. Since this in
formation is readily available and is generally
applicable to all fluorine facilities, these items
are treated only briefly in this paper.

Of greatest
in corrosion is insignificant.
concern is the contaminant left in the system due
to incomplete cleaning or contaminants that enter
the system during or after assembly. Any system
material that comes in contact with fluorine
should be immaculately clean to avoid uncontrolled
reactions. Support commodities such a pressurization helium and purge nitrogen used for fluorine
systems should be filtered, dry, and free of hy
drocarbon contaminants. Once assembled, the sys
tem should be kept under a positive pressure to
prevent the entrance of air and water vapor into
the system. Extensive studies have been conducted
on the reaction of organic materials under pas(2)
sivation conditions using gaseous fluorine.

Material Selection
Material selection is of prime importance in the
design of a facility using liquid fluorine. Basi
cally, all materials react with fluorine under
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LF 2 Storage Methods

These studies indicate that organic contaminant
reactions are sometimes incomplete and the residue
can be violently reactive with liquid fluorine,
either spontaneously or on shock or impact.
Therefore, stringent cleaning requirements to
eliminate contaminants from the system are abso
lutely necessary.

One of the primary considerations in the design
of a fluorine launch facility is the selection of
the fluorine storage method. Practical methods
of LF2 storage include on-pad storage, on-umbil
ical tower storage, mobile storage, and in vehi
cle tank storage. The principal elements, ad
vantages, and disadvantages of each of these con
cepts are presented.

After assembly, moisture may enter the system if
a positive pressure is not maintained at all
times. If moisture is present when fluorine is
introduced into the system, it will react to form
hydrogen fluoride, which can cause extensive cor
rosion damage. If sufficient moisture is present
to condense and form accumulations of water or
ice, a violent reaction may occur when fluorine
is introduced, resulting in possible burnout of
the system.

On-pad storage, downwind from the launch operation
is safe and practical. All preload activities
can take place in the revetted, protected, and
isolated area while other on-pad activities are
progressing. The storage area can be located at
a distance from the vehicle to provide maximum
protection from any on-pad vehicle incidents. The
transfer lines from the storage area to the space
vehicle tanks will be long and require consider
able cooldown time, either with LN 2 or LF 2 before
vehicle loading.

Because elimination of contaminants is critical,
it is of utmost importance to establish and ad
here to stringent cleanliness requirements. A
number of satisfactory cleaning and verification
methods have been developed by the various fluo
rine facilities and are described in the litera
ture.

The principal elements of this loading system in
clude a permanent remote storage area and transfer
piping to the vehicle. The storage dewar will be
used to receive and store liquid fluorine from
mobile dewars and also serve as a ready service
vessel during transfer operations.

Passivation
All parts of the system that will be in contact
with fluorine during actual operations must be
passivated before liquid fluorine is introduced
into the system. Passivation makes the internal
surfaces of the system inert by controlled re
action with gaseous fluorine. The internal metal
surfaces react and inert metal fluoride films are
formed that prevent or retard further reaction.
In the past it was felt that this controlled re
action would also remove any system contaminants
that remained after cleaning, but recent investi
gations indicate that this is dangerous prac

A second practical method of on-pad storage would
be to locate the storage dewar in the umbilical
tower or launch/umbilical tower (L/UT) . Storage
in this area would be at the vehicle fluorine tank
level and would include both LF 2 and LN 2 dewars
(see Figure 1) . The advantages of this approach
are the reduction of cooldown time, rapid response
loading, localized launch pad effected area, and
a reduction in venting or in LN 2 precooling re
quirements. The disadvantages are the storage of
LF 2 in the immediate vicinity of operations per
sonnel and the higher susceptibility of damage
either to or from the space vehicle in case of
problems.

Passivation must not be considered the
tice.
final cleaning step. The system should be pas
sivated only after the necessary cleaning and dry
ing have been completed.

The principal elements of this loading system are
the ground load station at the base of the umbil
ical tower, transfer piping up to the proper level
of the umbilical tower, a loading dewar, and
transfer piping to the vehicle. The loading dewar
will be used to receive and store liquid fluorine
from mobile dewars. The dewar will be vacuum and
LN 2 jacketed to retain the fluorine with no boiloff losses.

Passivation can be accomplished in a number of
ways, including the vacuum method, purge method,
or combinations of these, depending on system size
and complexity. Briefly, the vacuum method in
volves system evacuation, followed by repressurization with gaseous fluorine. The purge method
involves displacement of an inert purge gas with
a gaseous fluorine purge. Final passivation
should be performed using undiluted gaseous fluo
rine at the maximum system operating pressure and
at ambient temperature.

The fluorine dewar is loaded from a loading sta
tion at the base of the umbilical tower through a
liquid nitrogen-jacketed line. This transfer can
be accomplished prior to launch day. A mobile
dewar is moved to the loading station when re
plenishment is necessary. The liquid nitrogen
jacket on the fluorine line is dual purpose be
cause it is also used to transfer liquid nitrogen
to the nitrogen dewar loacted on the umbilical
tower.

LAUNCH FACILITY IMPACT
The basic problem is to provide the necessary
propellant storage, transfer, and disposal facil
ity for supporting an upper stage requiring up to
20,000 Ib of liquid fluorine. Various facility
configurations, vehicle loading methods , and spe
cific factors affecting the design of such a fa
cility are discussed in detail,

Since catastrophic dewar failures are almost un
known, this system does not present a severe haz
ard. However, to further decrease the hazard
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potential of the system, the storage dewars would
be located in a special enclosure. This enclosure
can be constructed on the outer edge of the um
bilical tower, out of the path of most operations.
The structure would use blast walls to separate
the dewars from the umbilical tower. Blast walls
would also be placed between the nitrogen and
fluorine dewars. The enclosure would be equipped
with a water fog deluge system for fire control and
decontamination in the event of dewar rupture or
burnthrough.

longer distances, the transfer lines should be
vacuum or LN2 jacketed. Where the venting or dis
posal of copious quantities of fluorine is unde
sirable, the lines should be LN 2 jacketed. The
LN2 jacket can be filled first to precool the line.
The LN2 also eliminates heat transfer into the LF 2
during transfer. If the LN 2 jacket is maintained
at atmospheric pressure, the fluorine will be subcooled with a vapor pressure of approximately 5
psia. However, a slight positive pressure (20
psig) in the LN2 jacket will maintain the LF2 at a
vapor pressure slightly above atmospheric to pre
vent the entrance of contaminants.

A third storage method involves use of mobile dewars that can be carried up the equipment elevator
to the vehicle fluorine tank level. Even if sev
eral dewars were required to fill the vehicle
tanks, this system has advantages of low fixed
facility costs and the extremely localized effects
on the total facility. Existing mobile dewars
with an LF2 capacity of 450 gallons weigh 10,000
lb (not including the LN2 or LF 2 weight) and are
approximately 23 ft long, 11 ft high, and 8 ft
wide. These dewars can service a space vehicle
with a maximum of several loads. This system
would not provide rapid loading because several
connections are required and the logistics of mov
ing the dewar to the vehicle would require some
time. Remote operation would be more difficult
and personnel would be in a relatively restricted
area (no rapid egress available). If only a few
launches are planned, the mobile dewars could be
located behind the barrier as discussed previously
without the additional costs of fixed piping and
dewar systems. Another possible configuration
would use mobile equipment located at the base of
the umbilical tower with a fixed transfer line to
the vehicle. Rapid personnel egress would be a
major advantage of this system over the other
mobile system.

The addition of an LN2 jacket has several advan
tages. Since fluorine will not react with LN 2 in
small quantities, the jacket can absorb some fluo
rine leakage with only minimal hazard. The leak
can be detected by sampling effluent from the LN2
vent stack. Considerably less fluorine disposal
or recycling will be required since no fluorine
boiloff will occur. The less hazardous operation
of precooling the transfer lines with LN2 permits
a shorter duration LF 2 transfer, which shortens
launch pad restriction time. Since the propel
lant is maintained in a single-phase flow condi
tion, less pressure will be required for transfer.
Heat transfer rates from the atmosphere to a
nitrogen-jacketed transfer line have been evalu
ated for various pipe diameters and frost or in
sulation thicknesses.
Nitrogen consumption in
pounds per hour can be readily estimated using
this information. The transfer line must be
sized to meet the flow rate and operating pres
sure requirements of the specific system. If
adequate transfer pressure is available the line
size should be optimized for diameter. However,
if pressure drop is critical, the line should be
optimized within limits of practical sizes. For
subcooled liquid fluorine, the line size can be
selected using standard equations.

A fourth method of loading the space vehicle in
volves preloading of the LF2 tank before mating the
stage to the booster. The tank would be loaded
from a permanent or mobile dewar in a remote serv
ice area. This process has been used successfully
for earth storables on several payload packages.
It has a severe disadvantage in that the light
weight vehicle tank will contain a hazardous cryo
genic commodity for several days while checkouts
occur. The maintenance of the unvented tank would
require an active refrigeration system on or asso
ciated with the vehicle.

Liquid fluorine can be transferred by pumping or
gas pressurization. It is desirable to transfer
fluorine without pumping. Although some develop
ment work has been done on LF2 transfer pumps, a
review of the literature failed to reveal any op
erational transfer pumps presently in service.
Pressurized transfer with makeup pressure by
helium is essentially trouble-free and very re
liable. The necessary transfer pressure can be
calculated by adding the frictional loss and the
head loss from standard equations. When trans
ferring to the vehicle, the minimum acceptable
pressure at the vehicle tank will be 16 psia to
preclude tank implosion and prevent contamination
from entering the tank. Transfer of the fluorine
from ground level to an upper stage level will
require relatively high pressure. These pressures
exceed the maximum operating pressure of presently
available dewars, necessitating the design and
fabrication of high-pressure storage vessels or
the use of a pump transfer system.

The specific quantities of propellant, countdown
time available for loading operations, number of
launches anticipated, and launch pad safety re
strictions will be important criteria in selecting
the proper storage method.
Propellant Transfer System
The transfer system configuration must be selected
concurrently with the storage system. Major areas
to be considered include transfer lines, control
valving, and the method of fluid transfer.

Regardless of the type of transfer system se
lected, design of the control valving should use
remote operation. Transfer valving and control
systems should not present major problems for the

The type of transfer line depends on the storage
method and the length of the line. For short dis
tances the transfer line may be uninsulated. For
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facility agrees well with the analytical model de(A\
veloped in this program. v '

designer since several operational fluorine facil
ities use adequate methods of transfer control.
Proper valve wiring (normal position in power
loss) and automatic system safing (closing valves
to isolate any damaged area) should be determined
by a thorough hazard or failure mode analysis and
incorporated in the design.

Rose modified the airborne tank by adding an LN2
spray system in lieu of the integral tube-type heat
exchanger.
Two manifolds, one at the top, and
one at the midsection of the tank, and several
perforated tubes are used to distribute a thin
film of liquid nitrogen over the outside surface
of the tank under the multilayer insulation. This
thin film of liquid nitrogen intercepts incoming
heat before it reaches the tank wall. The inter
cepted heat vaporizes the liquid nitrogen and the
resulting gaseous nitrogen diffuses out through
the multilayer insulation. In this way, the spray
cooling system purges the insulation and protects
the tank from incoming heat. Transfer is still by
the no-vent load method.

Space Vehicle Tank Loading and Ground Hold
A number of alternative on-pad loading concepts
are available. Fester, Page and Bingham have de
rived and experimentally proven a satisfactory
no-vent loading concept. (4) Rose suggests that

an LN2 overspray can be added to the vehicle tank
and the resulting gaseous nitrogen can be used
effectively to purge the high performance multi

layer insulation system on the tank.
NASA
LeRC has used an open top integral LN2 tank
(beanie) in facility operation and Rocketdyne has

The spray cooling system is used only for cooldown,
but it can be continued if an unexpected hold is
encountered after the fluorine tank has been
loaded. Normally, the gaseous nitrogen purge that
is maintained before loading propellants is con
tinued until launch. Both the gaseous nitrogen
purge and the liquid nitrogen used for cooling are
introduced into the insulation through the same
manifold.

used a closed top beanie.
Another alternative
is to load the tank in a vented condition, al
though this is not desirable since vented vapor
disposal or reliquefaction is required.
Fester, et al., in the Liquid Fluorine No-Vent
Loading Studies concluded a no-vent fill of a
(4)
prechilled vehicle tank is very feasible.
Based on this no-vent loading study, this method
appears satisfactory for loading fluorine into a
vehicle tank. The primary criterion, aside from
not venting, is to maintain a positive pressure
inside the tank to prevent implosion. The tank
would include an integral tube-type heat ex
changer on the tank wall.

In their facilities, NASA LeRC and Rocketdyne use
an LN2 container that is integral with the tank.
Although it was developed for ground storage, it
is possible to adapt the design for airborne use.
An open-top beanie as shown in Figure 2 can be
used to recondense the fluorine vapors resulting
from heat input to the tank. The beanie can be
drained just before launch. Rocketdyne ! s closed
beanie (see Figure 3) can provide the same type
of condenser with an additional feature of a con
trollable vent to keep the LN2 pressurized and the
fluorine tank pressure closely controlled.

Before loading, the ambient temperature tank would
contain 100% gaseous fluorine at about 60 psia.
The loading process would be initiated by cooldown
of the tank by passing cold GN2 or LN2 through the
integral heat exchanger. After the tank has been
cooled, propellant loading would be initiated.
The condition of the propellant being loaded would
be such that its temperature would be slightly
greater than its atmospheric saturation tempera
ture when entering the tank. The temperature of
the tank and loaded liquid would be maintained
slightly above the atmospheric saturation temper
ature to maintain the ullage pressure slightly
above one atmosphere. As loading commences, con
densation of vapor prevents the ullage pressure
from rising appreciably. After loading is com
plete, the tank would be pressurized with helium
to 15 psi above propellant vapor pressure and the
integral heat exchanger would be used to maintain
the propellant temperature within the desired
temperature band for ground hold. Adequately high
flow rates will be attainable with this method as
long as the initial commodity in the warm vehicle
tank is a condensible, such as GF 2 .

Another approach would be to cooldown the vented
vehicle tank with fluorine as the intial transfer
step similar to the loading methods used with
other cryogens. Heavy venting and the necessity
to recondense the GF2 or dispose of many pounds of
expensive fluorine makes this system very undesir
able. This method would necessitate continual
topping during ground holds.
The most efficient loading concept can be chosen
after vehicle on-pad-loaded hold times, tank sizes
and configurations, loading flow rates, insula
tion materials, and pad safety requirements are
known .
Vapor Disposal
Propellant handling at a launch facility will re
quire the venting of fluorine vapors during trans
fer, depressurization, or purge activities.
Methods of disposal of these vapors must be eval
uated and incorporated into the facility to pre
vent endangering personnel, property, water shed,
vegetation, or local wild life. Due to the toxicity and reactivity of fluorine, venting directly

No-vent loading is a very acceptable approach for
conducting load operations with high-energy propellants at the launch complex, where release of
toxic and reactive vapors must be minimized. Em
pirical data obtained in a 300-gallon LF2 flow
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to the atmosphere must be prevented. Several
methods are available to eliminate venting or to
dispose of normal vent vapors in a safe manner.

sensing at a launch complex. Basically six types
of leak detection methods are available.

^^ ^ Since it appears unlikely that all vent
ing can be eliminated, a combination of methods
appears feasible. The storage vessel can be
equipped with a recondenser to liquify boiloff
vapors from the system, a vaporizer for selfpressurization, and an LN2 jacket to subcool the
stored propellant. These features result in a
no-loss storage system that requires no normal
venting. However, venting of the storage system
could be required due to a control system mal
function or LN2 shortage. This venting along
with normal transfer line purging or vented tank
loading methods would require the system to in
corporate a vapor disposal system.

1)

The human nose;

2)

Ammonium hydroxide squirt bottles;

3)

Potassium iodide paper;

4)

An electrical warning system;

5)

Chemical instruments;

6)

Infrared sensors.

Extensive elaboration of these methods would only
be repetitive to other articles.
Briefly, however, the conditions that must be de
tected can be separated into gaseous fluorine
leaks, liquid fluorine leaks or spills, and vapor
concentration in effluents.

Methods available and presently used to detoxify
or dispose of fluorine vapors include hydrocarbon
burners, charcoal reactors, or alkaline chemical
treatment. (3) The methods most adaptable for use

at a launch facility are the hydrocarbon burner or
charcoal reactor. The hydrocarbon burner type is
installed at the top of a vent stack and reacts
the fluorine with propane or methane above the
stack exit. The reaction product is basically CF 4
and HF. Since HF is only slightly less toxic than
fluorine and is more corrosive, this system should
only be used in areas where venting of these prod
ucts would not be harmful or the vent rate is con
trolled so that tolerable atmospheric HF concen
trations are not exceeded. A charcoal reactor
similar to the one shown in Figure 4 would be
the best system for use at a launch facility of

A gaseous fluorine leak may stem from a leak in
an ambient temperature gas system, a semicooled
liquid system, such as during cooldown, or a
small leak in a liquid system when cooled down.
Any leaks require immediate attention to elimi
nate them. Most common among these are leaky
fittings, disconnects, valve stems, and instru
mentation ports. The human nose is a very good
sensor for low concentrations and can be relied
upon to tell a technician when concentrations
are growing. Ammonium hydroxide squirt bottles,
potassium iodide paper, or an electrical warning
system of the burgular alarm type can be effec
tively used to sense the leak. When leakage is
detected, the system should be vented; the exact
location determined, and immediately repaired.
Safety requires that all leaks be repaired in an
unpressurized and purged condition.

the size being considered.
This method in
volves the reaction of fluorine with wood charcoal
to form CFij. which is basically inert and nontoxic.
Small quantities of fluorine can be de
tected in the reactor effluent, but are generally
below 100 ppm and will rapidly disperse into the
atmosphere. The disposal rate is dependent on the
surface area of the charcoal available for reac
tion. The rate increases as the size of charcoal
particles decreases. Moisture or impurities in
the charcoal may result in HF in the effluent,
but the quantity should be small compared to that
of a hydrocarbon burner.

Liquid fluorine leaks or spills are very hazardous.
Usually a liquid leak will cause burning on con
tact with almost anything, including protective
clothing, surrounding incompatible or contaminated
equipment, and often the line from which it came.
Leaks of this nature can be sensed with infrared
sensors or burnout wires located in the area of
potential leaks. These sensors can be used to op
erate automatic deluge systems or to automatically
isolate the affected area. Conditions that must
be detected, but are not necessarily hazardous, in
clude fluorine concentration in jacket vent sys
tems, in the disposal stack, or in effluent purge
gases.

Both of these disposal methods can be used to
dispose of 100% fluorine vapor or vapor diluted
with N2 and/or He. Some dilution of the vented
fluorine vapor with an inert gas is recommended to
decrease the reaction temperatures and prolong the
life of the disposal system.

As noted, the LN2 jacket around fluorine transfer
systems helps minimize the hazard associated with
a leak in the fluorine line. Unfortunately, it
also obscures the location and makes detection
difficult. The addition of a fluorine sensing
instrument in the jacket vent system will aid in
determining the concentration, if any, of fluorine
being vented. A quantity limit, beyond which a
warning is sounded, can be established and used.

LEAK DETECTION

Leaks can be classified as hazardous to personnel
and/or hazardous to equipment. Adequate litera
ture is available to help in the selection of ap
propriate sensors for detection of the various
levels of leaks. Consistently, however, these
articles point to the inadequacy of all instru
ments designed for fluorine detection. Several
acceptable units are available, but each will
need attention to assure proper operation and

A very good method of determining when the char
coal level in the disposal unit is low is to
sample the disposal stack effluent. A small

4-61

amount
sensor
of 100
may be

neutralized. Other systems have been devised
that blanket spill areas with soda ash which neu
tralizes the fluorine. The dry soda ash deluge
method results in a solid residue that will pre
sent tremendous clean-up problems.

of fluorine will always be present so the
could be set to sound the alarm at a level
ppm. Sensing the hot effluent, however,
difficult with existing equipment.

Before any system that have previously contained
fluorine can be opened for maintenance it must be
thoroughly purged with an inert gas. Equations
regarding the required length of purge time exist
and can be used in conjunction with effluent sam
ples to assure safe concentration levels. Chem
ical sensors are very acceptable for this applica
tion.

The method for handling fluorine spillage must be
selected to suit the requirements of the specific
system. A method which is attractive for one area
can be completely unsuitable for another. Selec
tion of spill control for a launch facility must
be based on system requirements, probable spill
quantities, and system location. On the bright
side, many studies of fluorine spills indicate
the magnitude of the problem is grossly overstated.
In addition chances of these spills occurring can
be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, by proper
design and operation.

Leaks and spills are detectable and while they
pose the most hazardous safety conditions, they
can be minimized by proper design, care, and op
eration.
Propellant Spillage

Aborts

The design of any fluorine handling facility must
include provisions for handling accidental re
leases of fluorine. Although fluorine systems
are designed to eliminate all leakage, the reac
tive and cryogenic characteristics of the fluorine
make it virtually impossible to guarantee the pre
vention of accidental spills.

A launch facility for a liquid fluorine upper
stage must have the capability of safing the ve
hicle should a launch be delayed or aborted after
propellants have been loaded. The design of the
facility must provide for three different types of
aborts or delays.
The system must be capable of maintaining the
fluorine on board for extended hold periods if an
unscheduled launch delay is encountered. The
fluorine must be maintained in a flight condition
throughout any hold period. Because it is cryo
genic the fluorine will boil off during any hold
unless it is continuously cooled. Other cryo
genics are usually topped to make up for the boiloff losses. Fluorine can also be topped, but it
is necessary to neutralize or recondense the vent
gases. To prevent excessive venting it is pos
sible to refrigerate the fluorine tank to maintain
it in a no-vent condition.

Dispersion is usually considered effective for
small leaks of gaseous fluorine that create nonhazardous concentrations. The escaping fluorine
is allowed to diffuse into the surrounding area
and be dispersed by atmospheric conditions. The
amount of fluorine that can be disposed of safely
by this method is governed by the location of the
fluorine system. If the system is in a relatively
remote area, fairly substantial amounts of fluorine
could be safely released without treatment. The
reactivity and toxicity of fluorine make it nec
essary to treat most leakage or spills to limit
damage. Treatment methods include water deluge
and chemical neutralization.

The fluorine ground support system must provide a
means for off-loading in the event the launch is
aborted before liftoff. The off-loading capa
bility should include a rapid detanking mode for
emergency situations. Normal detanking can be
accomplished by back transfer to the facility
storage dewar. The storage dewar will have to be
vented down if it is being used for topping or if
loading has just been completed. The vent gases
from the storage dewar must be channeled through
the disposal system. Detanking can be accom
plished by pressure transfer using the vehicle
pressurization system to maintain the tank pres
sure.

Deluging of fluorine spills with a fine water
spray actually results in reaction of the fluo
rine with the water. The product of the reaction
is hydrogen fluoride. Sufficient water is used
to react with the fluorine and to dilute the re
sulting hydrofluoric acid to a harmless concen
tration. The reaction is exothermic, but this
heat is absorbed by the excess water used in the
deluge. Use of water for neutralizing fluorine
spills must be carefully evaluated because the
reaction is violent. In the case of large spills
it is difficult to apply sufficient quantities of
water to control the reaction. Insufficient
water only tends to spread the contamination. At
the other extreme if a small leak is deluged the
damage done by the water may be far greater than
that which would have been done by the fluorine
itself. It is necessary to contain and neutral
ize the contaminated water prior to release into
the water shed.

The necessity of venting the facility storage dewar, and in some cases terminating topping opera
tions to prepare for off-loading, could greatly
delay an emergency off-loading. Therefore, it
may be necessary to have a separate emergency
dump system. Emergency off-loading of most cryo
genics is accomplished by dumping the propellant
into a catch pond where it is allowed to boil off.
This cannot be permitted with fluorine. There
fore, it may be necessary to have a catch dewar
ready at all times to receive the fluorine in the
event it is necessary to dump the tank. Another

Another method of treating spills is to neutralize
the fluorine chemically. For liquid fluorine sys
tems, it is possible to provide catch basins which
contain limestone. The spilled fluorine is chan
neled to the limestone where it reacts and is
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possible method of emergency dumping would be to
off load the tanks directly to the vent disposal
system. The remote location of the system would
provide sufficient transfer lines to allow the
liquid to boil off before it reached the disposal
system. If necessary, a holding tank could be
included in the system to retain any liquid until
it boiled off and to control the disposal rate.

Atmospheric Conditions
To prevent creation of unnecessary hazardous con
ditions it is necessary to define the atmospheric
conditions under which operations can be con
ducted. Toxic and corrosive vapors must not be
carried by the winds into area where personnel or
property damage can occur. Therefore, it will be
necessary to evaluate any proposed launch facility
to determine which wind corridors permit safe
operations. Fluorine equipment must be located
to take advantage of prevailing winds to disperse
any fluorine vapors into safe areas.

One other type of abort affects the fluorine sys
tem. This is a catastrophic abort which occurs
prior to or immediately after liftoff. The ground
support system must be designed to minimize fluo
rine damage in the event of this type of abort.
Features of this system would include minimizing
the amount of fluorine left in transfer lines and
protecting storage dewars from damage.

Figure 5 shows a theoretical launch complex layout
for a fluorine vehicle. The fluorine storage
area and vent disposal burner have been sited so
that they are downwind of all activities the
majority of time. The wind corridor indicates
the permissible wind direction for propellant
transfer or launch operations. The hazard zones
indicate the areas where exposure can be expected,
should a spill occur. This type of evaluation
should be made for any fluorine launch facility.

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
General safety considerations will not differ
appreciably from those presently in effect for
other toxic or cryogenic propellants. The three
specific areas of safety that will require spe
cial emphasis are range safety, atmospheric con
ditions, and personnel protection.

An additional consideration to be included in
selection of wind corridors is the launch tra
jectory. The allowable launch wind corridors
should be selected so that the propellant re
leased from a vehicle destructed after launch
will be dispersed in a safe area.

Range Safety
As with any operation conducted at the Air Force
Eastern Test Range (AFETR) a launch facility for
a liquid fluorine stage must meet range safety
rules. It is also necessary for general fluo
rine safety rules to be met. This means that a
complete review of the current range safety rules
must be made to ensure that a comprehensive set of
rules are established.

Other atmospheric conditions that curtail opera
tions include temperature inversions, which pre
vent adequate vapor dispersion, and rain or fog.
Venting or inadvertent fluorine releases during
periods of precipitation result in the formation
of hydrogen fluoride, which not only causes
severe corrosion of the facility, but also con
taminates the vegetation, soil, and water shed.
Soil and atmospheric sampling programs should be
established to monitor for any long-term increase
in contamination due to fluorine operations .

In general, the range safety rules governing
toxic and cryogenic propellants are directly ap
plicable to this system. These cover areas such
as environmental safety, pad access, atmospheric
conditions, time of loading, etc. However, in
some areas, such as protective clothing, the cur
rent rules are not adequate for fluorine. This
indicates that each rule must be reviewed to de
termine if changes are necessary.

Personnel Protection
Much has been prepared regarding the subject of
personnel protection associated with fluorine sys
tems. Practices should not differ considerably
from protective equipment and safety practices for
more conventional earth storable hypergolic pro
pellants such as hydrazine, IRFNA, nitrogen
tetroxide, etc. The past record of handling fluo
rine is significantly free of accidents and can
form the basis for the personnel protection pro
gram at a launch complex. Personnel protection
extends far beyond any connotation of clothing and
first aid. To summarize, personnel protection
must include the following areas:

Education is one of the prime problems in obtain
ing adequate and realistic range safety require
ments for a fluorine system. To the uninformed
the word "fluorine" conjures up visions of un
controllable destruction. Thus, people who are
not familiar with fluorine technology will gen
erally set safety standards that are unnecessarily
restrictive. In some extreme cases the attitude
is to insist that fluorine cannot be handled
safely and therefore will not be permitted.
This problem makes it mandatory that a primary
effort in developing a fluorine launch facility
is the education of operations and safety per
sonnel. A coordinated effort can then be made to
develop adequate, comprehensive range safety rules
for fluorine systems.
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1)

System design considerations;

2)

Safety practices, rules, and regula
tions;

3)

Training programs;

4)

Launch complex operations including -

a)

Restriction of access to author
ized and necessary personnel,

b)

Personal and equipment cleanli
ness ,

c)

Protective clothing and breathing
equipment ,

d)

Controls for maintenance of trans
fer or storage systems,

e)

Provision of warning sensors.

the basic fundamentals and are continuously es
corted by well-informed and well-trained employees.
They should also be escorted to safe areas prior
to starting any hazardous operation such as vehi
cle tank loading. Any unnecessary personnel, even
though adequately trained, should be prohibited
from the proximity of any hazardous propellant
during transfer operations.
Personal and Equipment Cleanliness - Most or all
operational fluorine facilities have experienced
failures associated with lack of proper cleanli
ness controls. The required cleanliness level
inside the system is not argumentative but personal
cleanliness seems to be questioned. Tools, gloves,
hands, uniforms, etc, should be free of particles,
grease, dirt, lint, and general contamination.
Washing of hands both before and after fluorine
system work is essential. The small amounts of
hydrogen fluoride which may be present on valves,
lines, connections, etc, can burn almost as quickly
and severely as fluorine. External cleanliness
helps to promote and maintain internal system
cleanliness, and the latter is mandatory.

A brief discussion of each of these areas follows.
System Design Considerations - The protection of
personnel from the hazards of fluorine must be
considered starting with the design of the trans
fer and storage system. It will be an important
consideration in the choice of the location, lay
out, buildings and equipment design. The geog
raphy of the terrain, meteorological data, and
proximity to congested or densely populated areas
or to inhabited buildings should be included in
the basic considerations. All the above factors
include the protection of disinterested and un
informed personnel in surrounding areas. Rapid
egress for operating personnel must be considered
in locating piping, components, and pieces of
equipment.

Protective Clothing and Breathing Equipment - The
NASA-LeRC policy to use protective equipment only
when it improves safety should be a cardinal rule.
Three different levels of protection seem
warranted. Operations personnel should be out
fitted with aprons, face shields, hard hats,
gloves, and boots (see Figure 6). Each of these
items must be quickly removable in case of fire.
Rapid movement from the area is the prime reason
ing for this level of garmenting. A second, and
more protective style of clothing includes, a
self-contained breathing air pack and a full pro
tective uniform. A person in this clothing can
withstand higher levels of fluorine concentration
for short periods of time and can aid operations
personnel in case they become disabled in a fluo
rine atmosphere. Even this equipment should be
able to be removed rapidly since it won't be com
patible with direct sprays of fluorine and may
ignite and burn. Operating personnel may be out
fitted with this uniform if they must enter a very
restricted area and cannot evacuate the area com
pletely in case of a problem. A third type of
protection is applicable for most other personnel
required on the complex during hazardous opera
tions. This consists only of a gas mask equipped
with a special fluorine cannister (see Figure 7).
This device must only be used to effect an immedi
ate evacuation from the area. Blockhouse person
nel, supervisors, inspectors, safety personnel,
and personnel working in other areas should be
equipped in this manner.

Safety Practices, Rules, and Regulations - The
standard safety practices that prevail at instal
lations where hazardous or flammable chemicals
are stored should be in effect at the launch fa
cility. These practices include restricting the
traffic near or in the area and adopting the buddy
system. During any potentially hazardous opera
tion in restricted quarters, trained personnel
must be equipped with self-contained breathing
air and complete protective clothing so they may
come to the immediate aid of the operating per
sonnel in case of a spill or fire.
All operating procedures must be thoroughly checked
out on a dry or LN£ filled system before operations
begin with fluorine. Of course, strict adherence
to the procedures is mandatory. A periodic review
of rules and regulations and a periodic dry run of
the procedures is suggested.
Training Programs - The already successful train
ing programs in effect at KSC and AFETR, can easily
be modified to include fluorine training. The
alleviation of fear with retention of respect must
be a major goal of these training programs. Per
sonnel from operational fluorine facilities can
assist in the preparation of these training pro
grams .

Experience has shown that no safety clothing has
been devised that will give guaranteed protection
against a high pressure jet of liquid or gaseous
fluorine. ' The important thing regarding pro
tective materials is to subject them to a test
under simulated operational conditions, as opposed
to reliance on data from other tests that may or
may not be under similar conditions, and then
restrict their use to the proven conditions.

Restriction of Access to Authorized and Necessary
Personnel - The potential hazards increase in pro
portion to the lack of knowledge of fluorine and
its properties. For this reason, only authorized
personnel should be permitted on the launch com
plex during any fluorine operations. Official
visitors can be permitted if they are briefed on
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Controls for Maintenance of Transfer or Storage
Systems - Since it is desirable to maintain a
positive pressure in a fluorine system, any en
tries into the system can be assumed to spray
liquid or gas upon opening. Extra precautions
must be taken to assure no fluorine, and little
or no pressure, is in the system before entry.
Assurances should include valve position checks,
in-line fluorine concentration sensors, pressure
gages, helium or nitrogen purges, tags on valves
to assure no position change, and safety position
ing of all powered valves in case of a power out
age.

vehicle are currently available and it only re
mains to apply this information to the problem of
a specific vehicle and associated launch facility.
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Figure 7 Gas Mask for Evacuation Use

